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Jeffrey A. Frankel 
One has a choice of  events with which to date the beginning of  the current 
surge in regional economic arrangements. Europe has been in the forefront of 
this movement, so one could choose as the starting point the decision of  the 
European Community around 1986-87  to adopt the Single Market Initiative. 
Alternatively, one could argue that the key event was the decision by the United 
States, which became manifest in the negotiation and adoption of a free trade 
area (FTA) with Canada in 1988-89,  to abandon its long-standing opposition 
to regionalism.  Or, thirdly, one could emphasize  the spread of FTAs to the 
developing countries, the years  1990-9 1 seeing important regional initiatives 
in the Andean Pact, Mercosur, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
In any case, regionalism is with us. The subject offers ample new territory 
for research, empirical as well as theoretical. We  want to study a country’s 
raising or lowering of trade barriers, not vis-8-vis the world at large, but rather 
vis-8-vis particular neighbors. 
Most international trade research in the past has ignored the geographic di- 
mension. International trade models, whether empirical or theoretical, whether 
based on small-country or large-country assumptions, and whatever else their 
attributes, tended until recently to have one curious thing in common: they 
treated countries as disembodied entities that lacked a physical location in geo- 
graphical space. There are, to be sure, some things one can say about FTAs 
even without the geographic dimension, provided one is at least willing to in- 
clude three countries in the model. But many of the most interesting aspects 
of regional trading arrangements require the introduction of a geographic di- 
mension. Without it, one can hardly claim to be studying regionalism. 
Jeffrey A.  Frankel is professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and a 
research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, where he is also director of the 
program in International Finance and Macroeconomics. After this project was completed, he took 
leave to serve on the Council of  Economic Advisers. 
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This volume  addresses  several  large questions.  Why  do countries  adopt 
FTAs and other regional trading arrangements? To what extent have existing 
regional arrangements actually affected patterns of trade? What are the welfare 
effects of such arrangements? It is worth spelling out this third question more 
fully from the outset. In most economic  models, whether classical or new- 
fangled, economic welfare is maximized by worldwide free trade. The difficult 
questions arise when one assumes that this first-best solution is not attainable 
politically. Which is second-best: a system of most-favored nation (MFN), that 
is, nondiscriminatory tariffs? or a system where groups of  countries deviate 
from the MFN principle in order to form FTAs, which eliminate trade barriers 
internally  while keeping  them externally? Both systems contain distortions. 
Choosing between them is an exercise in the theory of the second-best. 
This volume focuses on trade. The issue of regional currency arrangements 
enters tangentially  into two of the chapters, by way of  their effects on trade. 
Other  aspects  of  regional  integration,  however,  such  as optimum  currency 
areas, financial issues, foreign direct investment,  and fiscal federalism, have 
been excluded from the volume, in order to keep it focused. 
Several of the chapters, particularly where the effects of regional arrangements 
are explored econometrically, make extensive use of the gravity model of bilat- 
eral trade. This model is a standard by which to judge what is the normal pat- 
tern of trade between  pairs of  countries, and thereby to judge when regional 
arrangements are having an extra effect on trade. The book thus begins with a 
chapter by Alan Deardorff, exploring the theoretical foundation for the grav- 
ity model. 
Until recently, it was said of the model that, although it fit the data well, it 
was sorely lacking in theoretical foundations. During the past fifteen years, the 
theory of trade in imperfect substitutes and increasing returns to scale has been 
developed, to the point where it is accepted as a theoretical foundation for the 
gravity equation. The empirical success of the equation has been adduced as 
evidence in favor of the imperfect-substitutes  theory, in comparison, for ex- 
ample, with the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade based on international differ- 
ences in factor endowments. Now Deardorff shows in chapter 1 that the gravity 
equation can be derived from the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, almost as easily as 
from the imperfect-substitutes theory. The equation has thus apparently gone 
from an embarrassing poverty of theoretical foundations to an embarrassment 
of riches! Those who debate the proper theory of trade will now have to reckon 
with the Deardorff paper. Those of us who wish to use the gravity equation as 
a tool for considering other questions can in any case proceed, with our heads 
held high. 
The first of  three chapters that use the gravity equation to study the effects 
of regional trading arrangements is by Barry Eichengreen and Douglas Irwin, 
who take a historical perspective in chapter 2. The idea is that the effects of 
regional arrangements can be imputed only to intraregional concentrations of 3  Introduction 
trade that exceed what can be explained by the economic fundamentals: coun- 
try size, income per capita, and distance between the pair of countries in ques- 
tion. In many such studies, a tendency for trading patterns to change relatively 
slowly over time has been observed, even when the change in regional trading 
arrangements or political links is sudden. Eichengreen and Irwin take the bull 
by the horns and include lagged values of bilateral trade in their gravity esti- 
mates for the period from 1928 to 1965. They find, for example, that trade 
links among British colonies in  1954 and  1964, which might otherwise be 
attributed to Commonwealth preferences, are in fact simply the lagged effects 
of  trade flows of  1949, when the countries belonged to the British Empire. 
Evidently, effects such as established marketing channels and brand-name loy- 
alty last long after the original reasons for initiating them may have vanished. 
The authors conclude that one should always include lagged variables in the 
gravity equation. 
In chapter 3, John Whalley provides the book’s  review of  recent regional 
initiatives, summarized in table 3.1. He then considers the motives behind 
countries’ decisions to participate. The motives include the use of  regional 
agreements to underpin domestic policy reforms, the desire to achieve more 
assured  market  access  with  large  trading  partners,  a  link  between  trade 
agreements and security arrangements,  the use of  agreements to strengthen 
collective bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations, and the use of 
regional negotiations as a threat to driving multilateral negotiations forward. 
Chapter 4, by Jeffrey Frankel, Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei, serves two 
purposes. First it uses the gravity model to examine the effect that explicit and 
implicit regional trading arrangements have had on trade. It takes up where 
chapter 2 leaves off, in the sense that the period covered is 1970-90.  It finds 
an intraregional bias to trade in each of three continental blocs: the European 
Community, the Western Hemisphere, and East Asia. 
The chapter then develops a theoretical framework for considering the wel- 
fare implications of  this regionalization of trade. It builds on Paul Krugman’s 
idea (1991b) that, in the presence of intercontinental transport costs, a world 
of three FTAs can be an improvement over the status quo of MFN, provided 
the FTAs are drawn along the natural geographic lines of the three continents. 
The chapter develops the idea that there is an optimal degree of regionalization, 
which is determined by the magnitude of transportation costs. If the margin of 
intrabloc preferences exceeds this optimal level, then it enters what we call the 
supernatural zone. We find that existing regional initiatives, such as the Euro- 
pean Union, are indeed in danger of  entering the supernatural zone, that is, of 
exceeding the extent of  regional preferences that can be justified on natural 
geographic grounds. This judgment leaves many factors out. Perhaps most im- 
portantly, it takes the worldwide level of tariffs as fixed exogenously. 
Chapter 5,  by Antonio Spilimbergo and Ernesto Stein, addresses a critique 
that has been made against the results of Krugman (199 la, 1991  b) and of chap- 
ter 4, namely that they depend on the assumption that trade is based on imper- 4  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
fect substitutes rather than  on differences  in factor endowments. At stake is 
whether a move from many small blocs to a few large blocs raises or lowers 
welfare. In the Spilimbergo-Stein model, trade is based on both imperfect sub- 
stitution and factor endowments. They first look at the case where transporta- 
tion costs are zero, which is the traditional assumption. The Krugman (1991a) 
result once again emerges, provided the elasticity of  substitution parameter is 
not too high, that is, consumers’ love for variety is not too low: welfare reaches 
a minimum at three large blocs. The world would  be better  off  with larger 
numbers  of  smaller blocs. If the love for variety  is very low, however, then 
welfare  is monotonically  decreasing in  the number of  blocs, justifying the 
skeptics. In this case, the model behaves like the factor-endowments model. 
The conclusion, which is that economic welfare is monotonically  increasing 
in the size of the blocs, would then offer a more optimistic outlook for region- 
alism. If  60 countries  combine into  12 blocs  of  5 countries  each, and then 
combine into 6 blocs of  10 each, followed by 3 blocs of 20 each, economic 
welfare is improved at every step of the way. This suggests that FTAs can be 
stepping  stones toward  the ultimate  goal  of  one bloc  of  60 countries,  also 
known as worldwide free trade. The authors go on to consider the effects of 
blocs formed between rich and poor countries, as compared to blocs among 
the rich and among the poor. 
Particularly interesting is what Spilimbergo and Stein find when they allow 
for intercontinental transport costs. Notwithstanding the introduction of differ- 
ences in factor endowments as a determinant of trade, the results are qualita- 
tively the same as in the model laid out in chapter 4 of  this volume. Specifi- 
cally, the three most important results continue to hold. (1) FTAs put the world 
into the supernatural zone (for a wide range of intercontinental costs). We are 
now able to see, however, that the effect is quite different in rich countries than 
in poor countries. The latter are likely to be better off from a move to four 
continental blocs, even though the rich are worse off. (2) Preferential trading 
arrangements can raise welfare, even for rich countries, provided the margin 
of preferences is not set too high. (3) The optimal margin of preferences rises 
with the level of intercontinental  costs. Unless intercontinental  costs exceed 
0.25 of trade value, however, the optimal margin of preferences is in the range 
of 20 to 30 percent. Anything above that level enters the zone of negative re- 
turns to regionalization, and anything over 60 percent enters the supernatural 
zone. 
It would probably be unwise, not to say monotonous, to rely exclusively on 
the gravity model’s analysis of trade quantities, for our information on the ex- 
tent  to which  the influences of  geography  versus regional  economic policy 
arrangements determine trading patterns.  Charles Engel and John Rogers  in 
chapter 6 offer an alternative approach: they examine prices rather than quanti- 
ties. There are excellent reasons to gauge international integration by the abil- 
ity of arbitrage to eliminate price differentials for similar goods, particularly 
where the null hypothesis is perfect integration between two markets. 5  Introduction 
They examine the behavior of final goods prices for eight goods (plus aggre- 
gate consumer price indexes) measured in twenty-three countries and eight 
North American cities. Deviations from the law of  one price are large; the 
question is what they have to tell us about regional influences. The authors find 
that the log of  distance has a statistically significant effect on relative price 
variability for  seven  out  of  nine  sectors  tested.  For  all  goods  combined, 
the estimate implies that a 1 percent increase in distance raises the monthly 
standard deviation of relative prices by  .00000789. The annualized impact of 
a  1 percent increase in distance is an increase in the standard deviation of 
.0000273, nearly identical to the effect that Engel and Rogers (1995) found in 
an earlier study using U.S. and Canadian city data. Even after allowing for the 
effect of  distance, however, there is a tendency for arbitrage to work better 
within regions than across regions. (Sharing a common border reduces relative 
price variability across countries as well.) 
This residual regionalization could be  due either to currency factors, re- 
gional trading arrangements, or other influences. Other influences include lin- 
guistic and political links. The authors introduce a theoretical model, in order 
to highlight the importance of an integrated network of  distribution and mar- 
keting within nations and within regions. Currency links are tested by includ- 
ing bilateral exchange rate variability in the regression equation. Exchange rate 
variability has a statistically significant positive effect on relative price vari- 
ability in all regressions, with the relationship close to one to one. Even after 
holding constant for proximity and currency links, regional effects remain for 
North America and Europe (less so for Asia). It appears that all four elements 
matter-distance,  currency links, regional groupings, and an unidentified re- 
sidual that could be due to integrated distribution networks. 
Chapter 7, by Frankel and Wei, picks up a number of threads. Again, we lead 
with the gravity model. Extensions relative to earlier work include updating the 
results  to  1992, estimating  imports  and  exports  separately,  and  including 
an effect for remoteness. (This last twist was  inspired by  the specification 
derived by  Deardorff  in chapter  1.) We  also present some estimates of the 
role that currency links may have played in promoting intragroup trade, as in 
chapter 6. 
The welfare analysis in chapters 4 and 5 took the level of  tariffs against 
nonmembers as exogenously fixed. The bulk of chapter 7 relaxes that assump- 
tion. Others have made various political-economy arguments regarding region- 
alism, either to the effect that it can undermine more general liberalization or 
to the effect that it can help build political momentum for multilateral liberal- 
ization. We  present a simple model of  our own that is in the latter category: it 
illustrates one possible beneficial effect of trade blocs as a political building 
block to further trade liberalization. The result could as easily go the other way, 
however. Is regionalism a building block to global free trade or not? The trade- 
diversion estimates of the gravity model provide a tentative assessment. 
One of the ways that the political economy of FTAs can set back trade liber- 6  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
alization  is  when  special  interests  are  able  to  influence the  terms  of  an 
agreement in their favor (as Bhagwati 1993 has emphasized). An  example 
is when a politically powerful industry manages to get itself exempted from 
the  elimination of  protective tariff  barriers. Article  XXIV  of  the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requires that liberalization within an 
FTA apply to all sectors. Even when this rule is obeyed, however, favored in- 
dustries can win the establishment of  long, drawn-out periods during which 
protection against the partner is phased out. This was the case with the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and is the subject of chapter 8, by 
Carsten Kowalczyk and Donald Davis. They find that American industries that 
have been able to win higher duties in the past tend to get longer periods of 
adjustment in NAFTA. The same pattern does not seem to hold for Mexican 
industries, however. The speed of  U.S. phase-out for a sector seems to affect 
the speed of  Mexican phase-out, suggesting reciprocity in the negotiations 
within narrow  categories. The authors conclude that  slow phase-outs were 
a concession that Mexico granted the United States, because it  wanted the 
agreement more badly (as suggested in chapter 3 and in Grossman and Help- 
man 1995). 
The book concludes with an overview of  the papers by Anne Krueger. This 
overview, like the comments on each of the papers, places the chapters in per- 
spective and helps to round out the discussion. 
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